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Abstract: This paper addresses the question of how (not what) we should think about 
human rights and religious arguments. Thinking about this relationship is today particularly 
important, because conflicts over human rights in practice often turn around their theoretical 
problems. Should religious arguments be used to justify human rights? Or do we want 
human rights to be free from any partisan endorsement so as to avoid divisive interpretations 
of universal principles? Underlying these hard questions is the issue of justification in view of 
a plurality of cultural and religious traditions around the globe. If human rights can be 
transformed so as to defy the charge of Euro-centrism (of being parochially rooted in only 
one cultural and religious tradition), they need to creatively draw on, not pit themselves 
against, this plurality. This paper suggests a framework for such a positive and inclusive 
engagement with various cultures and religions that goes beyond the mainstream liberal 
model of “public reason”. 














What is it that political theory has to say about human rights? Given the many forms in 
which human rights discourses are (ab)used in global politics today – human rights can, 
that much has become clear over the last decades, be invoked for emancipatory as much 
as for imperialist causes – this question is far from trivial. The starting point of this paper 
will be that political theory, roughly and incompletely speaking, engages in two tasks when 
dealing with human rights. On the hand it attempts to address the issue of justification. 








political theory needs to confront is that of critique: Do we need to criticize human rights 
as they are currently practiced, and if so, on what terms? 
Although it is obvious that both tasks are intertwined – justification and critique inform 
each other in complex ways that would require further elaboration – the upcoming 
reflections will mainly focus on the first task. More specifically, I will try to think through the 
role that religious arguments can play in human rights discourses. As has been pointed 
out recently, the genealogy of human rights cannot be reconstructed in purely secular 
terms (Freeman, 2004). While religious arguments have, thus, historically played a 
formative role in, for example, the European natural rights tradition, the problem in the 
contemporary debate is how to conceive of the justification of human rights in view of the 
plurality of cultural and religious traditions around the globe. This is, in the eyes of many 
commentators, the great challenge human rights need to face up to: if human rights can 
be transformed so as to defy the charge of Euro-centrism, they need to be based on a 
pluralistic justification (Gregg, 2010; Santos, 2002). 
Typically, the relationship between human rights and religious arguments is evaluated 
in a rather dichotomous fashion: Either religious arguments are euphorically invoked so as 
to support human rights (Stackhouse, 1981; 1998) or they are vehemently rejected so as 
to keep human rights untainted from any unenlightened ideology that might in fact breed 
divisive conflicts, instead of containing them (Henkin, 1998).1 The goal of this paper is to 
show that such a dichotomous view is simplistic, and to offer a primer for a more 
differentiated account. I will try to realize this goal by arguing that, if we understand human 
rights as expressions of a discursive and dynamic modus vivendi, we will be better 
equipped to assess the appropriateness of religious arguments for human rights 
discourses. The advantage of the proposed conception of justification is that it allows for a 
historically informed, context-sensitive evaluation of the relationship between religious 
arguments and human rights. Therefore, the title of this paper already indicates where I 
would like to take the argument: What ensues is rather about how in general we should 
think about the relationship between human rights and religion than about what we should 
think about it more specifically. It is, hence, an exercise in establishing formally the 
conditions under which reflections on this relationship should take place, thereby 
complementing the work of those who have already started to examine this relationship in 
more concrete ways (Santos, 2009). 
                                               
1
 By “religious arguments” I mean concepts derived from religious doctrines. This definition, which is 
deliberately broad, leaves the question of exegetic authority wide open. While the question of who can decide 
over the extent of religious doctrines is undoubtedly important, I am in this paper more concerned with the 
function these arguments, once they are made, can fulfill in human rights discourses. However, as will 
become clear later on, I believe that religious doctrines are malleable and flexible in the sense that all texts 
(including sacred ones) are open to interpretive contestation and reform. This is the lesson, hinted at in the 

















The paper has the following structure. Section (II) lays out the terrain on which the 
debate takes place, mapping the spectrum of (non-)justification in human rights 
discourses. The next step (III) will lead to an extensive discussion of the notion of “public 
reason”. The purpose of this discussion is to explore whether “public reason” may help us 
make sense of how justifications work in human rights discourses. In response to the 
theories of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, section (IV) introduces a modified 
understanding of modus vivendi and suggests that this understanding can better inform 
the issue of justifying human rights. The last part of the paper (V) will examine this 
suggestion in a concrete context, namely with regard to an Islamic interpretation of human 
rights. Here, I finally turn to the relation between religious arguments and human rights, 











Before we move on to the main purpose of the paper, some conceptual clarification 
regarding the act of justification is needed. When political theorists discuss the issue of 
justifying human rights, they locate their standpoint on a spectrum of possible positions.2 
In order to see where the idea of a discursive and dynamic modus vivendi is placed on 
this spectrum, we should start by identifying the extremes. 
On one extreme of the spectrum we can identify the notion that human rights need a 
stable fundament so as to work properly in the “real world”. This view states that some 
sort of justification is absolutely essential for successful policies involving the expansion of 
human rights regimes. “Stable fundament” stands here for a particular kind of justification 
that can be labeled as universalist. A universalist justification claims to be valid across 
different cultures and traditions. One consequence of this universalism is that human 
rights are conceived as uniform and homogenous over time. There must be no variation in 
the way how particular cultures or traditions interpret and enact human rights – indeed, 
human rights need a stable fundament precisely so as to show where particular cultures 
and traditions violate the minimal standard set by human rights. Of course, there are 
various manners in which this stable fundament can be conceptualized: by referring to 
basic human interests, for example. The very concept of interest (and its protection) then 
provides a basis on which human rights can be normatively built.3 Another route would be 
to anchor human rights in the idea of personal dignity, which occupies a pivotal place in 
much of post-Kantian theorizing (Donnelly 1982; Habermas 2010). Let us name this 
                                               
2
 For a useful overview of the main issues involved in justifying human rights see: Fagan (2005). 
3
 To concentrate on the main theme of this paper, I am simplifying matters at this point. For, even if we only 
focus on “human interests” as a stable fundament for human rights, we are dealing with a number of positions 








extreme point on the spectrum of possible positions the hyper-foundationalist view of 
justifying human rights. 
On the other extreme of the spectrum we can identify positions that radically call into 
question the importance of a stable fundament for human rights. So-called anti-
foundationalists reject the suggestion that human rights need a justification in the 
universalist sense described above. What the proponents of this view suggest instead is 
that human rights be mainly, and perhaps exclusively, seen from the perspective of 
practitioners: of those who work in the field of human rights law and policy. Political theory 
has, on this account, close to nothing meaningful to say about human rights, as long as it 
maintains that its task is primarily to deliver a rock-solid justification.4 
For the question of assessing religious arguments in human rights discourses, the 
deeper issue of justification is undeniably relevant. If one takes the hyper-foundationalist 
account to be correct, one has to prove beyond any doubt that religious arguments do 
indeed provide a stable fundament for human rights, that certain doctrines support the 
principled enshrined in human rights. Consequently, the challenge is to demonstrate in 
what ways religious arguments are not only compatible with, but even foundational of, 
those principles. On this account, the voice of political theory is a leading, even 
outstanding, one: without it, human rights would be lost. If one feels, on the other hand, 
more convinced by the anti-foundationalist approach, the very idea of a stable fundament 
appears problematic. Thus, religious arguments will be given relatively little attention, 
because any justification (no matter how it proceeds) is futile. Here, the voice of political 
theory is barely perceivable: without it, nothing would change for human rights. 
Things get more muddled in the middle, between the extremes. While hyper- and anti-
foundationalism mark the end points of the spectrum, the majority of philosophical 
positions lie in-between. All these positions start from the assumption that a justification of 
human rights can be useful for the practice of human rights in some respects, but they 
distinguish themselves from hyper-foundationalist approaches in that they reject 
universalist pretensions. They argue that it is feasible to proffer a justification for human 
rights without aiming for an a-historical, context-transcendent fundament. The reality of 
different non-Western cultures and traditions is here not taken as a insurmountable 
                                               
4
 However, anti-foundationalists seem to believe that other tasks are open to political theory, such as 
designing persuasive narratives about why human rights law and policy should become more acceptable 
around the world. The most important proponent of such an anti-foundationalist conception of human rights is 
undoubtedly Richard Rorty (1998). However, there are, just like in the case of hyper-foundationalism, many 
subtle variations of the idea that human rights need no deep philosophical foundation. See, for instance, the 

















challenge to the universality of human rights; rather, these cultures and traditions are seen 
as resources for deepening the concrete meaning of universality.5 
What unites most positions that lie between the extremes of hyper- and anti-
foundationalism is that they put special emphasis on the kind of agreement that is needed 
so as to secure a global culture of human rights. I believe that these positions are, by and 
large, more convincing than either the hyper- or anti-foundationalist view. Human rights 
can be justified, but not in the way hyper-foundationalists imagine, by appealing to a set of 
a-historical, context-transcendent principles. One commonly held assumption among 
liberal scholars is that, in the face of deep diversity caused, for example, by the clash of 
religious doctrines, the model of “public reason” formalizes this kind of agreement best. I 
want to suggest, hence, that a side-look at the debates on public reason and the place of 
religion in the public sphere can open up new perspectives for the topic we are more 















As a generic term, “public reason” is concerned with providing criteria for evaluating the 
validity of arguments circulating in the public sphere. To establish which reasons count as 
public is, thus, to separate acceptable from inacceptable justifications in deliberations 
among citizens. Since John Rawls’s ideas have been framing the subsequent 
discussions, it will be useful to quickly highlight the key issues involved in his use of the 
notion. 
Rawls’s project in Political Liberalism, and generally in his later philosophy, is to offer 
a freestanding justification for a constitutional regime in which all citizens can be 
integrated equally.6 “Freestanding” means that a political conception of justice must refrain 
from reaching out to any “comprehensive doctrine”. The term “comprehensive doctrine” 
does not only encompass natural candidates for individual or collective visions of the good 
life, such as religions and ideologies, but also liberalism in the broad sense. The 
                                               
5
 Perhaps most prominently among these intermediary positions, we can recently witness the rise of a 
“practical” interpretation of human rights that distances itself from both the hyper- and the anti-foundationalist 
view on justification. Proponents of this practical interpretation agree with the anti-foundationalists about the 
futility of a deep philosophical justification. Instead of concentrating on a stable fundament, they take the 
current practice of human rights “as it is” in order to establish how human rights work in the international 
arena. Their function, it is widely argued, consists of limiting state sovereignty – the violation of human rights 
standards legitimizes the use of force across borders. Therefore, human rights are determined by the role they 
play in international relations, as yardsticks for assessing the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions. The 
best formulation of this practical interpretation of human rights can be found in: Beitz (2001; 2003). For 
another account of the relationship between human rights and intervention see: Tasioulas (2009). Another 
widely discussed proposal is to conceptualize human rights in terms of an “overlapping consensus” to which 
particular traditions and cultures can subscribe. See: Bielefeldt (1998); Twiss (1998). 
6








astonishing assertion in Political Liberalism is that liberalism itself can be counted as such 
a vision of the good life.7 
The freestanding conception of justice propagated by Rawls imposes on citizens a 
“duty of civility” (Rawls, 2005: 444). This duty expresses the obligation of every citizen to 
make independent use of two kinds of reasons: as a supporter of a comprehensive 
doctrine, for example as a believer in the precepts of Roman Catholicism or as a left-
leaning activist, a person might hold multiple views on matters of communal significance. 
Nevertheless, these views must not, on Rawls’s account, be offered as reasons in civic 
deliberations. Once they step into the forum of civic deliberations, citizens need to be 
willing to offer only those reasons for their decisions and actions that can be accepted by 
all other citizens, irrespective of which comprehensive doctrines they themselves may 
support. 
There is one important disclaimer to add here, though: Rawls wants his ideal of public 
reason to be applied only to debates of highest importance, or what he calls debates 
about “constitutional essentials” and “matters of basic justice” (Rawls, 2005: 442). In 
response to sharp criticism of his earlier views on public reason, Rawls also makes it clear 
that citizens are in fact allowed to make use of their comprehensive doctrines in 
deliberative processes as long as they are willing and able to provide “in due course” 
arguments that can be shared by everyone. He refers to this revision as the “proviso” that 
specifies a wide view of public reason (Rawls, 2005: xlix-l). Further, Rawls introduces a 
crucial distinction between the “political forum” – encompassing judges and their 
decisions, the discourses of government officials and the announcements of candidates 
for public office – and the “background culture” of civil society. From this distinction it does 
not follow, however, that citizens who are formally situated outside the political forum 
should refrain from making use of public reason, as we shall see shortly. 
The intuition behind the bracketing of comprehensive doctrines says that, given the 
fact of “reasonable pluralism” in modern democracies, i.e. given the simultaneous 
existence of equally justified views of the good, political liberalism “deliberately stays on 
the surface” (Rawls, 1985: 239). The strategy of public reason entails circumventing 
divisive conflicts that would, on Rawls’s account, inevitably erode the fundament of society 
once debates about justice became dominated by a clash of idiosyncratic allegiances to 
particular values. To argue politically, as opposed to metaphysically, depends, thus, on 
the abstraction from one’s deepest commitments. 
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 This is the reason why Rawls conceives of political liberalism as a parsimonious and non-perfectionist 
version of thick liberalism. This idea is connected to what Rawls calls the priority of the right over the good. A 
right-based defense of justice as fairness claims to remain neutral towards the entirety of individual or 

















Note that the requirement of reciprocal acceptability inherent in public reason stands 
in stark contrast to mere toleration, where not more than a fragile modus vivendi between 
different individuals or groups with their comprehensive doctrines is at stake. A modus 
vivendi offers, in Rawls’s view, a solution to the problem of “reasonable pluralism”, but it 
proceeds in the wrong way because it merely establishes a precarious equilibrium point 
between otherwise antagonized opponents. Instrumental rationality and strategic action 
are not enough to elucidate “society as a system of fair social cooperation between free 
and equal persons” (Rawls, 2005: 9). Public reason, on the other hand, aims at deepening 
the consensus on which diverse societies are built, for it engages all citizens in a 
conversation about normative foundations. This requirement of neutrality governing civic 
deliberations evidently has massive consequences for Rawls’s interpretation of religion. 
The overarching question is: “How is it possible […] for those of faith, as well as the 
nonreligious (secular), to endorse a constitutional regime even when their comprehensive 
doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed may decline?” (Rawls, 2005: 459) 
Rawls stipulates that public reason circumscribes a space from which all 
comprehensive doctrines are excluded by the same token. Since secularism figures as a 
“comprehensive nonreligious doctrine” (Rawls, 2005: 452), public reason must not be 
mistaken for secularism. The translation of comprehensive doctrines into the register of 
public reason, thus, instigates a process through which each citizen is forced to leave her 
idiosyncratic allegiances behind and articulate her concerns through the common 
language of citizenship. As has already become clear, not only state officials such as 
judges, parliamentarians or candidates for public office are bound by the “duty of civility”, 
but also ordinary citizens must in their debates over constitutional essentials and matters 
of basic justice refrain from advancing visions of the good life. Citizens need to act as if 
they were ideal legislators in the public sphere when holding officials in the political forum 
accountable (Rawls, 2005: 444). 
Let us now turn to Habermas. The German philosopher grapples with Rawls’s 
proposal by sorting out lessons that he deems more valuable than others. While 
Habermas shares, and indeed stresses, Rawls’s focus on civic deliberations, he also 
sides with those who criticize Rawls for asymmetrically burdening religious people.8 In 
what sense can it be argued that the “duty of civility” is unfairly disposed towards 
believers? On the one hand, Habermas claims, it is a matter of empirical observation to 
state that religious people cannot simply split their identity into one part governed by the 
principles of a comprehensive doctrine, and another part governed by the ideal of public 
reason. In opposition to Rawls, Habermas insists that it is not always possible for a 
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believer to find widely accessible formulations for her positions that correspond to, and 
map on, the reasons originating in a comprehensive doctrine. It is overly demanding for, 
and therefore unfair to, the believer to always seek a duplication of her set of reasons, 
depending on where the discussion takes place. On the other hand, there is also a moral 
consideration that reveals why Rawls’s insistence on public reason might be 
disingenuous: 
 
There is a normative resonance to the central objection, as it relates to the integral 
role that religion plays in the life of a person of faith, in other words to religion’s ‘seat’ 
in everyday life. A devout person pursues her daily rounds by drawing on belief. Put 
differently, true belief is not only a doctrine, believed content, but a source of energy 
that the person who has a faith taps performatively and thus nurtures his or her 
entire life. (Habermas, 2006: 8) 
 
In this passage, Habermas submits that the obligation to establish a split identity 
between private believer and public citizen underestimates the moral weight faith 
possesses. Recall that the duty of civility demands from all citizens to draw a parallel 
between public reason and comprehensive doctrine. This demand, however, might be 
doomed to fail if there plainly are no corresponding formulations for one’s positions that 
would be publicly accessible. It is, thus, conceivable to imagine a genuine collision 
between religious values (or any other comprehensive doctrine) and public reason, 
because many believers support a specific policy regarding constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice on the grounds that their religion considers it authoritative. It might 
even be said that a crucial component of faith is precisely that only religious values can 
motivate and orient the believers’ standing in civic deliberations. 
The moral weight of comprehensive doctrines supplies a strong argument against 
excluding religious beliefs from the public sphere. The duty of civility advocated by Rawls 
could in the end lead to a disenfranchisement of religious people, and this would obviously 
diminish the stabilizing effect of civic deliberations. If religious people are asked to remain 
mute in the public sphere due to an inability to access public reason, their standpoints 
cannot become contributions in the process of ideal legislation. This danger of excluding 
religious people motivates Habermas to modulate Rawls’s proposal in one significant 
respect. 
 
The liberal state must not transform the requisite institutional separation of religion 

















who follow a faith. […] Every citizen must know and accept that only secular reasons 
count beyond the institutional threshold that divides the informal public sphere from 
parliaments, courts, ministries and administrations. But all that is required here is the 
epistemic ability to consider one’s own faith reflexively from the outside and to relate 
it to secular views. Religious citizens can well recognize this ‘institutional translation 
proviso’ without having to split their identity into a public and a private part the 
moment they participate in public discourses. They should therefore be allowed to 
express and justify their convictions in a religious language if they cannot find 
secular ‘translations’ for them. (Habermas, 2006: 8-10) 
 
The crucial argument in this passage concerns the distinction between the “informal” 
and the “formal” public sphere. This distinction is pivotal to Habermas’s double-tiered 
model of deliberation. Democratic opinion-formation takes place in the informal, weak 
public sphere that is characterized by disorder and fluidity. All types of arguments can be 
exchanged in this branch of the public sphere, because the channels of communication 
are completely unregulated. In contradistinction to the anarchic structure of opinion-
formation, democratic will-formation is subject to more organizational restrictions. The 
main venues for democratic will-formation are located in the formal, arranged public 
sphere of the judiciary and the parliament. Although Habermas suggests that the informal 
and the formal public sphere rely on, and communicate with, each other, he conceives of 
them as distinct branches (Habermas, 1996). 
It is the institutional threshold separating the informal from the formal public sphere 
that decides over the admissibility of religious beliefs. The state has to be unequivocally 
secular and firmly rooted in the repudiation of faith-based arguments. While Rawls wants 
to ban religious beliefs, just like any other comprehensive doctrine for that matter, from the 
public sphere in general, Habermas argues for the inclusion of believers’ standpoints 
within the anarchic structure of opinion-formation. Respect for the equality of religious 
people commands such inclusion; further, it is of paramount importance for the society at 
large not to cut itself off from positive resources of meaning: 
 
Religious traditions have a special power to articulate moral intuitions, especially 
with regard to vulnerable forms of communal life. In the event of the corresponding 
political debates, this potential makes religious speech a serious candidate to 
transporting possible truth contents, which can then be translated from the 
vocabulary of a particular religious community into a generally accessible language. 








sphere and the formal proceedings within political bodies are also a filter that from 
the Babel of voices in the informal flows of public communication allows only secular 
contributions to pass through. (Habermas, 2006: 9)  
 
The hope is that allowing religious beliefs in the public sphere would trigger processes 
of mutual learning from which all members of society might benefit. Such a learning 
process is necessary because today the modern world faces the threat of scientism: 
Recent debates about the freedom of will tend to be overshadowed by results generated 
from neurological research, and Habermas presumes that a scientifically restricted 
conception of personhood might narrow down the scope of civic deliberations. We need 
religious beliefs in the public sphere to counterbalance the “naturalistic self-objectification” 
fetishized by the natural sciences. 
But religious beliefs can only flourish in the public sphere when they are seen as 
productive in the course of civic deliberations. More than mere toleration is required in a 
postsecular society. Once religious beliefs are permitted to inform and transform the 
debates in the public sphere, it would be a waste of resources if secular persons refused 
to take those beliefs seriously. Hence, Habermas insists that adaptive changes need to 
affect both religious and secular persons. Believers must become reflexive with regard to 
other religions and accepting of the secular foundations of the state. Non-believers, on the 
other side, must open themselves to the possibility that religious persons have in fact 
something meaningful to say in the public sphere. During this process all parties, 
consequently, have to cooperate in the informal, weak public sphere. 
Let us recapitulate the argument about religion in the public sphere as it has been 
advanced by Habermas: At the heart of his approach lies a concern with both the 
legitimacy and the social cohesion of the constitutional state. Toleration based on 
indifference or ignorance is inadequate to address the challenges of deeply diverse 
societies. This becomes particularly evident in the context of contemporary Europe where 
past colonialism and present immigration put pressure on political systems to 
accommodate cultural differences. Habermas envisions the constitutional state as being 
based at once on private and public autonomy, on the liberal idea of basic rights and on 
the republican idea of democratic self-government (Habermas, 2001). Freedom of religion 
as a legal guarantee is, thus, a meaningful option only if the state enables its citizens to 
participate actively in the process of ideal legislation. It follows that civil society (the 
informal component of the public sphere) needs to be inclusive of, and responsive to, all 
members of a political community, while the state (the formal component of the public 

















A social arrangement akin to a modus vivendi is structurally insufficient to tackle the fact 
of reasonable pluralism because it undercuts the requirement of public autonomy on 
which both Rawls and Habermas draw. The next section will address the issue whether 
Rawls’s and Habermas’s refutation of modus vivendi is indeed as plausible as it appears 












One of the main characteristics of the discussions about the role of religion in the public 
sphere lies, as we have witnessed, in the assertion that tolerance as indifference and 
ignorance is insufficient to accommodate the concerns of believers in a democratic polity. 
The underlying charge is not so much that toleration is “repressive”, as Herbert Marcuse 
has famously proclaimed, but rather that it fails to provide religious people with 
opportunities to refer to their profoundly felt convictions about controversial issues in the 
course of deliberations, without asking them to translate these convictions into the neutral 
language of citizenship. This failure to make voices heard can create a legitimacy deficit 
that might endanger the stability of the democratic polity, because, within a liberal 
framework, legitimacy can only be fostered through political autonomy, that is, through 
laws for which all citizens can claim authorship. A modus vivendi between different 
comprehensive doctrines would be too instable to secure social cohesion. What is, 
therefore, needed is an espousal of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice 
“for the right reasons”. 
However, sceptics have argued that this focus on agreement “for the right reasons” 
might be fallacious, since it misconstrues the power relations pervading every political 
order. Against Rawls and Habermas, they have forcefully maintained that the ideal of 
neutrality on which public reason rests is both illusionary and dangerous. The ideal is 
illusionary, for the standards of reasoning according to which arguments in the public 
sphere are evaluated inevitably bear the hallmarks of power structures within a society. It 
is also dangerous, because the existence of power structures is covered up by the claim 
that public reason remains independent of, and even antithetical to, these power 
structures. The main contention of these sceptics is that, since all institutions and 
arrangements in the public sphere are imbricated with power relations, it would be 
incorrect to make legitimacy and social cohesion reliant on a conception of justice that is 
radically dissimilar from a modus vivendi. Following this train of thought, it is fruitless to 
seek to establish criteria for a just society, without taking into account the power relations 









This reflection gives rise to the need to reconsider the notion of modus vivendi as it is 
commonly conceived. Rawls and Habermas draw a very bleak picture of modus vivendi 
so as to make their alternative search for legitimacy and social cohesion for the “right 
reasons” appear more convincing. Duncan Ivison has explored the tension between public 
reason and modus vivendi in more depth with regard to the challenges that liberalism 
faces in the context of postcolonialism.9 Ivison asks us to consider whether the ideal of 
public reason can help address the grievances of those who have been disenfranchised in 
the public sphere over a long period. In the postcolonial states that Ivison analyzes 
(Canada and Australia), aboriginal peoples are especially vulnerable to unfair treatment 
in, and orchestrated exclusion from, the public sphere. Nevertheless, appealing to the 
availability of public reason does nothing to alleviate the suffering of such minorities, as 
they usually lack the material and symbolic means to challenge and alter the conditions 
under which the public is negotiated. Another point of importance is that the Rawlsian 
scheme focuses too much on comprehensive doctrines as distinct systems of values, 
while the fact of the matter is that social, cultural and political identities intersect and 
converse with each other. Ivison then comes up with an insightful distinction between two 
ways of conceiving of modus vivendi: 
 
(1) A simple or static modus vivendi: The parties are motivated to comply with 
political norms only where it is in their interest to do so, where ‘interest’ is narrowly 
defined in terms of individual or group self-interest. 
(2) A discursive and dynamic modus vivendi: The parties are motivated to comply 
with political norms where it is in their interest to do so, but (a) these interests 
include moral interests, and (b) over time, the demands and practices of social and 
political cooperation may come to be seen as fair and reasonable. However, the 
content of what is ‘fair and reasonable’ is always incompletely theorized and tied to 
the constellation of ‘registers’ or discourses […] present at any given time in the 
public sphere. (Ivison, 2002: 84-85) 
 
Accepting the idea of a discursive and dynamic modus vivendi implies that the appeal 
to a freestanding justification of principles of justice must be modified in order to reflect the 
fact that what counts as public reason is itself a matter of societal and historical struggles. 
Supporters of a discursive and dynamic modus vivendi, thus, reject the idea of a 
freestanding justification, without giving up on the concept of public reason as such. 
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 In fact, Ivison seems to have applied the revised notion of modus vivendi to a number of contexts, including 

















Citizens might accordingly be thought of as having different sets of preferences for 
endorsing a political regime or a social arrangement, yet power structures effectively have 
to be acknowledged as playing a role in shaping these preferences. If we rethink public 
reason in terms of a discursive and dynamic modus vivendi, we abstain from seeing these 
power structures as negative obstacles on our path to attain legitimacy and foster social 
cohesion. Rather, they are taken as constitutive of real politics. It is important to 
emphasize that this does not eradicate the possibility of consensus. The members of the 
public sphere might still arrive at some form of agreement over the “practices of social and 
political cooperation”, but this concord always remains open to contestation and cannot be 
anchored in an abstract set of “right reasons”.10 Although Ivison maintains that the 
conflictual nature of public reason must be recognized, he does not side with proponents 
of agonistic democracy who are sceptical of any form of consensus (Mouffe, 1993; 2000; 
2005). Agreement is in fact viable, yet the debate about fair terms of social and political 
cooperation remains by its very nature open-ended and contingent.  
If we take this rejoinder from the outside of mainstream liberalism seriously, we 
manage to navigate between overly consensualist modes of public reason such as 
Rawls’s and Habermas’s, and overly conflictual views that deny the feasibility and 
desirability of agreement in general.11 We can then scrutinize the relationship between 
power and justification, which is pivotal for the idea of public reason as well as for the 
discussion of religion, in a new and instructive light. If the attempt to eradicate power from 
the justification of a political regime or a social arrangement is conceptually futile, it 
becomes mandatory to analyze the existing power structures in their current configuration 
so as to comprehend which justificatory moves can hopefully be successful and which 




















How do these insights about the shortcomings of “public reason” of the Rawlsian and 
Habermasian variety translate into the discussion around the relationship between religion 
and human rights? In the concluding section, I would like to explore what effect such a 
revised notion of modus vivendi might have for the justification of human rights. For a 
start, it should already have become clear why the debate around public reason bears 
                                               
10
 For more critique of public reason that resonates with Ivison’s invective, see: Maclure (2006); Steinberger 
(2000). 
11
 There are, however, other formulations of public reason that are closely related to the revised notion of 
modus vivendi I am pursuing here. I am particularly thinking of Henry Richardson’s idea of a “deep 
compromise” as opposed to consensus, even if this proposal is based on a disavowal of “bare compromise” 
identified with modus vivendi (Richardson, 2002); For other moves in a similar direction see: Arnsperger and 








upon the justificatory engagement with human rights. As noted above, we are often 
confronted with two contradictory, and indeed dichotomous, views regarding the 
normative potential of religious beliefs: either they are, thanks to their sectarianism and 
divisiveness, deemed too dangerous to be considered candidates for justification; or they 
are optimistically, sometimes even enthusiastically, embraced in an attempt to craft an 
overlapping consensus between widely diverging visions of the good life. 
Ultimately neither of these views is convincing. It would be more persuasive, or so I 
wish to argue, to conceive of the justificatory engagement with human rights by treading 
the middle path prepared through an altered notion of modus vivendi.12 From the 
perspective of a discursive and dynamic modus vivendi, things look like this: while the 
access of believers to the deliberative process, with their own panoply of reasons, is 
welcomed, the search for an endorsement of human rights “for the right reasons” is 
canceled. Keeping in mind that all institutions and arrangements are entangled with power 
structures of some sort is of paramount importance for discussing the triangular 
relationship between religion, secularism and human rights. This implies that a specific 
type of justification of human rights, based on the presumption of neutrality and context-
transcendence, must be discarded. 
However, this dismissal of a specific type of justification does not collapse into the 
anti-foundationalism advocated by some postmodernists, such as Richard Rorty. To claim 
that human rights are to be understood as products of power structures does not 
necessarily imply that they are, from the viewpoint of non-Western cultures, alien tools of 
domination. The perspective of a dynamic and discursive modus vivendi rather obliges us 
to shift the analytical focus so that the now vacant place of a neutral and context-
transcendent justification of human rights is filled with more complex and variable 
processes of deliberation. Religious beliefs can and will fulfill a variety of functions in this 
respect: they can and will be offered as genuine contributions in discussions about human 
dignity for instance, but they can and will also become argumentative weapons in the fight 
over which exegetic engagement with human rights should prevail. This polyvalence 
cannot be tamed by appealing to a translation proviso, wherever it may be located. 
                                               
12
 To be sure, Habermas’s ideas are perceptive as regards the bonds between religion, secularism and 
human rights. The German philosopher takes the challenge of the postsecular condition seriously when he 
accuses rigid and uncompromising versions of secularism of obstructing the democratic enterprise of 
inclusion. His argument against those who merely stress the divisive potential of religious beliefs is forceful, 
because it encourages both believers and non-believers to acknowledge each other as equal partners in the 
deliberative process. Transposing Habermas’s proposal to the debate about human rights means to make use 
of the idea of a translation proviso within the framework of human rights. The two-tiered conception of the 
public sphere could be interpreted as a blue-print for distinguishing between areas where all kinds of 
reasoning would be permissible and areas where only secular arguments would be allowed. This distinction 
would help secure a hard core of human rights, protected by the threshold of the translation proviso, to which 

















Power and justification are, therefore, intimately tied up with each other. 
Consequently, it is a matter of concretely examining local contexts so as to determine how 
power and justification cut across each other in given situations. This requires a context-
sensitive approach. As an example for such a differentiated engagement with human 
rights and religious arguments, let us briefly hint at the work of Sudanese law professor 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im.13 An-Na‘im has, over the last 15 years, developed the most 
comprehensive proposal for exploring the positive synergy between religion, secularism 
and human rights. The idea that each element in this triangular relationship is 
simultaneously dependent on, and enabling of, all other elements figures at the heart of 
An-Na‘im’s project. At first sight, this idea is, of course, controversial, because the 
standard notions of religion, secularism and human rights emphasize the divergences 
between these elements and pit them against each other. However, An-Na‘im intends to 
vindicate the universality of human rights in terms of an overlapping consensus to which 
various cultural traditions can subscribe without perceiving human rights as alien tools of 
domination. In order to reach this goal, An-Na‘im seeks to transform the standard notions 
of religion and secularism by showing that rows over whether human rights are universal 
or particular are futile: religion, secularism and human rights must be seen as supportive 
and accommodating of each other.14 
In doing so, An-Na‘im is far from denying the potentially violent frictions between 
religion, secularism and human rights, surfacing for instance when religious regimes 
discriminate against minority groups; but he insists that the only way to salvage the claim 
of human rights would be to explore the universal within particular traditions. This is, on 
An-Na‘im’s account, as much an empirical observation as it is a normative expectation. 
Only an internal dialogue between the precepts of human rights and different cultures will 
address the grievances of those who presume that the Western imprint on human rights 
has been overwhelmingly strong: 
 
I do not mean to suggest that human rights provide the answer to all problems of 
differential power relations, whether locally or beyond. Rather, my point is that 
human rights need to be ‘owned’ by different peoples differently, otherwise they will 
be perceived as simply another mode of Western coercion. In other words, 
legitimating human rights in local cultures and religious traditions is a matter of vital 
                                               
13
 An-Na‘im has published widely on human rights issues. His work can be seen as path-breaking in the sense 
that he tries to bridge the philosophical gap between religious hermeneutics and legal interpretation (An-
Na‘im, 1987;  1989; 1991;  2000a;  2000b;  2001;  2005a; 2005b) 
14
 In his latest book, An-Na‘im vindicates the concept of the secular state from an Islamic standpoint. The main 
claim of this book concerns the need for reforms from within those communities in which human rights 








importance for the survival and future development of the human rights paradigm 
itself. Religions must also be encouraged, from within, to provide moral 
underpinnings for fresh development of the paradigm in order to address emerging 
issues in differing contexts. The contribution of secularism to these critical 
developments must be to provide the political stability and communal security 
essential for negotiating a unique and dynamic relationship between human rights 
and religion in every setting internationally. (An-Na‘im, 2005b: 68) 
 
This passage is pivotal to the novel interpretation of human rights I would like to 
advance in this paper. The process of “owning” human rights in various cultural settings is 
one in which power structures are evidently present. Power structures condition the way 
how human rights are appropriated by various traditions and cultures. If we want to find 
out which justificatory moves will be successful and which not, we need to study theses 
concrete configurations of power, just like An-Na‘im proposes in his comparisons of 
different Muslim countries (An-Na‘im, 2008). 
To return to the governing theme at the beginning of this essay, namely how to make 
sense of the voice of political theory in human rights discourses, let me finish with this 
observation: If we subscribe to the proposition that political theory must seriously engage 
the reality in which it operates, which is one of the implications of this paper, it follows that 
it has to reject both hyperfoundationalist self-aggrandizement and anti-foundationalist self-
effacement. What emerges, then, is the horizontal vision of political theory as one among 
many, equally important voices, all of which are entangled in a conversation over theories 
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